Best practices in prediction for decision-making : lessons from the atmospheric and earth sciences by Pielke, Roger A. & Conant, Richard T.
 
 
 
This is the author version published as: 
 
 
This is the accepted version of this article. To be published as : 
This is the author version published as: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Catalogue from Homo Faber 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
 
Pielke, Roger A. and Conant, Richard T. (2003) Best practices in 
prediction for decision­making : lessons from the atmospheric and 
earth sciences. Ecology, 84(6). pp. 1351‐1358. 
           
Copyright 2003 Ecological Society of America 
1351
S
pec
ial
Featu
r
e
Ecology, 84(6), 2003, pp. 1351–1358
q 2003 by the Ecological Society of America
BEST PRACTICES IN PREDICTION FOR DECISION-MAKING: LESSONS
FROM THE ATMOSPHERIC AND EARTH SCIENCES
ROGER A. PIELKE, JR.1,3 AND RICHARD T. CONANT2
1Center for Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Colorado/CIRES, 1333 Grandview Avenue,
Campus Box 488, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0488 USA
2Natural Resource Ecology Lab, A217 Natural and Environmental Science Building, Colorado State University,
Fort Collins, Colorado 80523-1499 USA
Abstract. Predictions that result from scientific research hold great appeal for decision-
makers who are grappling with complex and controversial environmental issues, by prom-
ising to enhance their ability to determine a need for and outcomes of alternative decisions.
A problem exists in that decision-makers and scientists in the public and private sectors
solicit, produce, and use such predictions with little understanding of their accuracy or
utility, and often without systematic evaluation or mechanisms of accountability. In order
to contribute to a more effective role for ecological science in support of decision-making,
this paper discusses three ‘‘best practices’’ for quantitative ecosystem modeling and pre-
diction gleaned from research on modeling, prediction, and decision-making in the atmo-
spheric and earth sciences. The lessons are distilled from a series of case studies and placed
into the specific context of examples from ecological science.
Key words: atmospheric sciences; best practices; decision-makers; earth sciences; prediction;
quantitative ecosystem modeling.
INTRODUCTION
A cautionary tale
In February 1997, forecasters predicted that the Red
River of the North would see flooding larger than at
any time in modern history (Pielke 1999). At Grand
Forks, North Dakota, forecasters issued a prediction
that the flood would crest at 49 feet (;15.1 m). On 22
April 1997, at Grand Forks, the Red River crested at
54 feet (;16.6 m), inundating the communities of
Grand Forks, North Dakota and East Grand Forks, Min-
nesota, causing up to US$2 billion in damages. In the
aftermath of the flood, local, state, and national officials
pointed to inaccurate flood forecasts as a cause of the
disaster. With hindsight, a more reasoned assessment
indicates that by any objective measure the accuracy
of the forecasts was not out of line with historical per-
formance. Instead, both forecasters and decision-mak-
ers failed to understand the uncertainty associated with
the prediction and the implications of uncertainty for
decision-making. Pielke (1999) provides a comprehen-
sive assessment of the use and misuse of forecasts in
the Grand Forks flood, including a discussion of alter-
native outcomes.
A review of past predictions shows that the U.S.
National Weather Service predictions of flood crests in
Grand Forks from 1982–1996 had a mean error of 10%
of the predicted crest (Pielke 1999). In 1997, this mean
Manuscript received 3 December 2001; revised 10 April 2002;
accepted 25 May 2002; final version received 28 June 2002. Cor-
responding Editor: J. S. Clark. For reprints of this Special Fea-
ture, see footnote 1, p. 1349.
3 E-mail: pielke@cires.colorado.edu
error would have been 4.9 feet (1.51 m) of the 49 foot
(15.1 m) prediction. We can never know what decision-
makers in Grand Forks would have done with a more
accurate understanding of the inherent uncertainty as-
sociated with the flood outlooks. However, it is clear
that mistaken perceptions of the flood forecasts con-
tributed to decisions that were not robust with respect
to the realistic range of outcomes related to the flood.
In this case, the prediction process broke down, even
though potentially useful information was available.
This cautionary tale illustrates that when the prediction
process is evaluated according to criteria of good de-
cisions, and not good predictions, the role of prediction
and modeling in decision-making has complex and per-
haps counterintuitive elements. In the case of the 1997
Grand Forks flood, a ‘‘good’’ prediction product, as
measured by the criterion of accuracy, arguably con-
tributed to bad decisions. This experience and others
like it (see the case studies in Sarewitz et al. 2000)
should give pause to anyone in the sciences seeking to
develop models and predictions as an aid to decision-
making.
Prediction in science, prediction for decision
The allure of prediction is strong. In science, many
view predictive skill to be the ultimate confirmation of
theory and understanding. In decision-making, predic-
tive capabilities appear to offer the promise of control
over the future. The twin goals of understanding and
control have proved tempting attractions for the sci-
ences of recent decades. Considerable public resources
have been invested in programs of prediction justified
by simultaneous scientific and policy objectives in ar-
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eas such as global change, earthquakes, nuclear waste
disposal, asteroid impacts, flooding, weather, beach
erosion, etc. Ecological science, according to some, is
now ready to join this bandwagon of research programs
focused on developing predictive knowledge as a guide
to decision-making. For example, a recent workshop
reported ‘‘an evolving science of ecological forecasting
is beginning to emerge and could have an expanding
role in policy and management’’ (Clark et al. 2001:
657). The report defines ecological forecasting as ‘‘the
process of predicting the state of ecosystems, ecosys-
tem services, and natural capital, with fully specified
uncertainties, . . . contingent on explicit scenarios for
climate, land use, human population, technologies, and
economic activity’’ (Clark et al. 2001:657).
As a contribution to learning across disciplines, this
paper summarizes several important lessons as ‘‘best
practices’’ from experience in prediction in the earth
and atmospheric sciences in support of decision-mak-
ing (Sarewitz et al. 2000). Specifically, an evaluation
of prediction in 10 case studies in the earth and at-
mospheric sciences (weather, flooding, asteroid im-
pacts, earthquakes, beach erosion, water quality, nu-
clear waste disposal, hydrocarbon reserves, acid rain,
and climate change) provides a set of lessons for the
effective production and use of predictive knowledge.
This paper proceeds by summarizing three ‘‘best prac-
tices’’: effective use of predictions results from a focus
on predictions as one component in the process of de-
cision-making, prediction for science and prediction for
policy should not be conflated, and prediction products
are difficult to evaluate and easy to misuse.
THREE LESSONS LEARNED
Lesson 1: Effective use of predictions results from
focusing on prediction as one component in the
process of decision-making
As the case of flood forecasts in Grand Forks illus-
trates, the successful use of predictions (i.e., making
good decisions) depends upon much more than just
‘‘good’’ predictive information. The prediction process
must include the participants, perspective, institutions,
values, resources, and other factors that together de-
termine the prediction enterprise and how the predic-
tion enterprise contributes to public demands for action
or tools with respect to the issues that they bring to
the attention of decision-makers. Weather forecasts
have value not because they are by any means perfect,
but because the vast experience of users of those pre-
dictions fosters the incorporation of them into decision
routines (Hooke and Pielke 2000).
Though frequently generated, policymakers fre-
quently overlook, neglect, or are unable (for technical,
institutional, or political reasons) to use potentially use-
ful ecological predictions. For instance, cleanup and
environmental mitigation of exotic zebra mussels in
the Great Lakes costs US$20–100 million annually.
Though an early report documented the potential spread
of zebra mussels into the region (Bio-Environmental
Services 1981), policymakers failed to act upon the
report, not because it was inaccurate or too complex,
but because decision-makers involved in the regulatory
process had little experience considering such ecolog-
ical forecasts (Clark et al. 2001). With the advantage
of hindsight, a result was that potentially useful eco-
logical knowledge was not integrated into decision-
making (Clark et al. 2001).
Consider another example. Ecologists have known
since the 1940s that fire is an integral component of
many ecosystems and fire histories for many forests
are well known (Millspaugh et al. 2000, Mohr et al.
2000, Veblen et al. 2000). Recent additions to federal
wildland fire policy recognize that ‘‘the role of wildland
fire as an essential ecological process and natural
change agent will be incorporated into the planning
process,’’ and that ‘‘fire management plans and activ-
ities are based upon the best available science,’’ (U.S.
Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of In-
terior 1995). Evolution of the traditional forest fire sup-
pression approach in favor of a new let-it-burn ap-
proach was based on well-established knowledge about
fire and fuel loads. However, as a result of the history
fire suppression, fuel loads were at record levels in
many forests. Thus, similar to the situation described
by Peterson et al. (2003), the decision to adopt a new
approach contributed to the recent spate of catastrophic
forest fires, most notably the Yellowstone fires of 1988,
the South Canyon Fire during 1994, and the Cerro
Grande fire of 2000.
Like the Grand Forks example, these examples re-
lated to ecological science point to prediction as one
component in a broader process. This broader predic-
tion process can be thought of as three integrated sub-
processes (Sarewitz et al. 2000): a research process that
includes the fundamental science, observations, etc., as
well as forecasters’ judgments and the organizational
structure which go into the production of predictions
for decision-makers; a communication process that in-
cludes both the sending and receiving of information;
and a choice process that includes the incorporation of
predictive information in decision-making. Of course,
decisions are typically contingent upon many factors
other than predictions. Often, some mistakenly ascribe
a linear relation to these processes, and consider them
to be independent of one another. From the perspective
of decision-making, these three processes are instead
better thought of as components of a broader prediction
process, with each of the subprocesses taking place in
parallel, with significant feedback and interrelations
between them. (A note on nomenclature: here, as in
Sarewitz et al. (2000), we use the term ‘‘prediction
process’’ to acknowledge the complexity (i.e., multiple,
parallel, decision and social processes) associated with
the connections of scientific prediction and policy.)
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Peter Drucker has written an eloquent description of
the modern organization that applies equally well to
the prediction process:
Because the organization is composed of specialists,
each with his or her own narrow knowledge area,
its mission must be crystal clear. . . otherwise its
members become confused. They will follow their
specialty rather than applying it to the common task.
They will each define ‘‘results’’ in terms of that spe-
cialty, imposing their own values on the organiza-
tion.
—Drucker (1993:54)
Drucker continues with an apt metaphor:
The prototype of the modern organization is the sym-
phony orchestra. Each of 250 musicians in the or-
chestra is a specialist, and a high-grade one. Yet by
itself the tuba doesn’t make music; only the orchestra
can do that. The orchestra performs only because
all 250 musicians have the same score. They all sub-
ordinate their specialty to a common task.
—Drucker (1993:55)
In the process of modeling and prediction in support
of decision-making, success according to the criteria
of any subset of the three processes does not necessarily
result in benefits to society, just as the success of any
one section of an orchestra does not imply good music.
Consider the following examples in light of
Drucker’s metaphor:
1) The case of developing skillful predictions of
earthquakes in the Parkfield region of California
brought together seismologists with local officials and
emergency managers (Nigg 2000). A result was better
communication among these groups and overall im-
proved preparation for future earthquakes. In this case,
even though the predictions themselves could not be
shown to be skillful, the overall process worked be-
cause it identified alternatives to prediction of specific
earthquakes (e.g., robust engineering design) that have
led to decisions that are expected to reduce the impacts
of any future earthquakes in this region. The key to
this success was recognition of the actual predictive
capacity of earthquake science.
2) The case of global climate change may be in the
early stages of what was documented in the case of
earthquakes (Rayner 2000). Policy-making focused on
prediction has run up against numerous political and
technical obstacles, meanwhile alternatives to predic-
tion—such as no-regrets adaptation and mitigation pol-
icies (i.e., reducing societal vulnerability to extreme
events and fostering national energy independence)–
have become increasingly visible. The prediction pro-
cess can be said to work if the goals of climate policy—
to reduce the impacts of future climate changes on
environment and society—are addressed, independent
of whether century-scale climate forecasts prove to be
accurate (Sarewitz and Pielke 2000).
3) The case of nuclear waste disposal has also
evolved from one in which decision making focused
first on developing skillful predictions to one in which
decision-making focused instead on actions that would
be robust under various alternative futures (Metlay
2000). In this case, the policy problem of storing nu-
clear waste for a very long time (and associated un-
certainties) was addressed via decision-making (i.e.,
engineering), not accurate prediction over thousands of
years.
4) Adaptive management encourages land managers
to experiment rather than strictly adhere to fixed ob-
jectives (Lee 1999). Experimental implementation of
ecological predictions coupled with detailed monitor-
ing and adaptive responses is a model that encourages
close collaboration between ecologists and land man-
agers, and could lead to successful integration of eco-
logical science with environmental management in a
similar fashion to what has been document in other
cases (cf. Brunner and Clark 1999). This illustrates the
importance of adaptability and flexibility in manage-
ment decision processes rather than the accuracy of
predictions.
From this varied set of experiences, a lesson that can
be found for decision-makers is that one is, in most
cases, more likely to reduce uncertainties about the
future through a focus on decision-making rather than
through a focus on prediction. Key to this shift in focus
is an accurate calibration by decision-makers of what
prediction can and cannot do (Clark et al. 2001, 2003,
Ellner and Fieberg 2003). The criteria for evaluating a
prediction are thus directly related to the purposes for
which it is to be used.
Lesson 2: Don’t conflate prediction for science and
prediction for policy
The work of most scientists falls squarely within the
research-process component of the prediction process.
It may seem intuitive that success in ecological re-
search—independent of whatever happens in the other
processes—would necessarily lead to predictions of
great utility to policymakers, but, as discussed above,
a ‘‘good’’ prediction alone is frequently inadequate to
lead to good decision outcomes. And, in a field such
as ecology, understanding the ‘‘goodness’’ of predic-
tion products is fraught with difficulties due to the com-
plexity of the systems under investigation and the lack
of extensive experience with making predictions. Thus,
it is important to understand how the criteria of good
science may or may not fit with the criteria of good
decisions. Two distinctions raised here are the differ-
ences between prediction for science and prediction for
policy, and differences between policy advocacy and
policy research.
Because prediction plays multiple roles within the
scientific enterprise, there exist obstacles to the effec-
tive use of predictive information in decision-making
(Pielke 2003). For instance, some assert that predictive
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capabilities are what make science ‘‘scientific’’ and are
the ultimate test of knowledge, while others view pre-
diction as simply a heuristic tool for advancing knowl-
edge (cf., Sarewitz and Pielke 1999, Oreskes 2000,
Pielke 2002). In ecology, Holling (1995) identifies
‘‘two streams of science’’ in conflict.
The first stream is a science of parts . . . It emerges
from the traditions of experimental science, where a
narrow enough focus is chosen to pose hypothesis,
collect data, and design critical tests for the rejection
of invalid hypotheses. The goal is to narrow uncer-
tainty to the point where acceptance of an argument
among scientific peers is essentially unanimous.
—Holling (1995:13)
The second stream is a science of the integration of
parts.
It uses the results and technologies of the first but
identifies gaps, develops alternative hypotheses and
multivariate models, and evaluates the integrated
consequence of each alternative by using informa-
tion from planned and unplanned interventions in
the whole system that occur or are implemented in
nature. The premise of this second stream is that
knowledge of the system we deal with is always in-
complete. Surprise is inevitable.
—Holling (1995:13)
These two streams of science—the first focused on
prediction as hypothesis testing and the second on char-
acterizing irreducible uncertainties—imply dramati-
cally different approaches to research, and by extension
to the relation of research to decision-making objec-
tives. Conflation or confusion of these approaches can
lead to bad science, misuse and abuse of scientific in-
formation, and bad decisions (Bankes 1993, Sarewitz
and Pielke 1999, Pielke 2003).
Consider the case of intentional species introductions
for food, fuel, and fiber, which have been, for the most
part, very successful according to the goals of each
introduction. However, spectacular historical failures
(e.g., kudzu in the southeastern United States and rab-
bits in Australia) resulted from a failure to fully ap-
preciate potential ecosystem impacts. The current de-
bate on the use of genetically modified crops is similar
in that it is an attempt to evaluate the likelihood of
unintended consequences of purposive human actions
(Merton 1936). Developing ecological knowledge to
evaluate the threat of introduction of genetically mod-
ified organisms clearly requires input from both of
Hollings’ ‘‘streams’’ of ecological science. For ex-
ample, understanding plant hybridization potential and
resulting plant fitness fall squarely within the realm of
Hollings’ first stream, but impacts of genetically mod-
ified corn pollen on nontarget species, such as monarch
butterflies (Losey et al. 1999), cannot be predicted ac-
curately by following this approach. Since large sourc-
es of pollen—such as an agricultural field—can trans-
mit pollen, and corresponding genetic information,
across a broad region, other approaches may be nec-
essary to evaluate potential impacts (Hails 2000). Ul-
timately, successful decision making may result from
clear-eyed recognition that accurate prediction of the
long-term environmental and human effects of genet-
ically modified organisms is not possible and that al-
ternatives to prediction should be sought in the policy
process.
For scientists seeking to venture more deeply into
the forest of policy relevancy, it is also important to
distinguish political advocacy from policy research.
Political advocacy seeks to reduce the degrees of choice
available to decision-makers, often focusing on one
particular policy alternative. Policy research, in con-
trast, seeks to expand the alternatives before decision-
makers to allow for greater freedom of choice (Pielke
2002). Science can be used (or misused) in support of
advocacy to focus decision-maker attention on a par-
ticular policy alternative, or in support of generating a
wider range of alternatives that may allow for progress
to be made in situations of gridlock or intractability.
Scientists often speak of ‘‘reducing uncertainty’’ in un-
derstanding while policy advocates seek to ‘‘reduce
uncertainty’’ in decision outcomes. These different def-
initions of ‘‘reducing uncertainty’’ are often conflated
in policy debate as if the former necessarily implies
the latter. This would be a misinterpretation of both
science and policy, as in every case a range of policy
alternatives is consistent with any particular level of
scientific understanding or uncertainty.
For example, within the scientific community, the
debate over the relationship between biodiversity and
ecosystem function is, on the surface, a debate on a
very complex scientific issue (see Tilman 1996, 1997,
Huston 1997, Wardle 1999). However, advocates of one
policy or another promote only the scientific infor-
mation that supports their own objective whether it is
species preservation or easing land use restrictions. The
argument is often less about science than about dif-
ferent philosophical approaches to ecosystem manage-
ment, including the aesthetic, spiritual, and ethical val-
ue of biodiversity. In this sense, the biodiversity debate
places a thin veneer of science over a thick underbody
of policy and politics (Guterman 2000).
Advocates on one side or another of debates like
biodiversity or climate change frequently point to sci-
entific certainty (or consensus) as a necessary threshold
for policy action. In reality, decision-making can (and
does) occur at any level of uncertainty. Understanding
uncertainty and the range of policy alternatives con-
sistent with such understanding are likely more effec-
tive contributions to decision-making than seeking to
narrow uncertainties in science or decision outcomes
(Pielke 2001). For scientists seeking to place their work
into the context of policy, it is therefore important to
exercise caution in engaging in political advocacy if
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decision-making would instead benefit from research
that expands, rather than limits decision alternatives.
Lesson 3: Prediction products are difficult to
evaluate and easy to misuse
When forecasters issue a prediction there is a con-
siderable challenge for users to understand what the
prediction actually means (Sarewitz et al. 2000). For
example, Murphy et al. (1980) document that, when
forecasters issue a forecast of 70% chance of rain, peo-
ple typically understand what ‘‘70%’’ means and what
‘‘rain’’ means but they do not know whether the fore-
cast refers to a 70% chance of rain at each point in the
forecast zone, or that 70% of the area of the zone with
receive rain with 100% probability, or other possible
interpretations.
Even in situations where there is no ambiguity about
the predicted event, there remains a considerable chal-
lenge facing users in understanding what the prediction
actually means. Take, for example, the predictions of
maximum high temperature issued by the Hydrological
Prediction Center (HPC) of the NOAA National Cen-
ters for Environmental Prediction. HPC forecast veri-
fication provides the mean errors in maximum tem-
perature forecasts for predictions made three, four, five,
six, and seven days in advance (available online).4 For
example, in 2000, the mean error for maximum tem-
perature forecasts three days into the future was a little
more than 4.58F (;2.58C). For forecasts of maximum
temperature seven days into the future made in the same
year, the mean error was slightly more than 6.58F
(;3.68C). Thus, while a prediction of, say, 708F three
days hence and a prediction of 708F seven days hence
refer to the exact same event, they have very different
meanings because of the different level of empirical
uncertainty in the forecast. Whether or not those dif-
ferent meanings would be important to a particular
forecast user depends upon the specific context in
which the forecast is being employed (e.g., planning a
picnic or buying an energy supply option). Whether
the forecast is worth using would depend upon the
decision context as well as other available information,
such as the mean absolute error associated with using
naı¨ve prediction methods, such as climatology or per-
sistence.
The complexity of ecological processes in the con-
text of broader processes of decision-making makes
understanding (by both scientists and decision-makers)
of predictive information challenging. For example, the
Cerro Grande fire disaster of 2000 began as a prescribed
fire with an approved fire plan, but the fire burned more
than 44 times the intended area, destroyed 235 homes,
and threatened Los Alamos National Laboratory (Lon-
nie et al. 2000). Sources of confusion included under-
rating of fire complexity, misuse of the fire complexity
rating system, and different fire complexity rating sys-
4 URL: ^http://www.hpc.ncep.noaa.gov/html/hpcvrftxt.html&
tems employed by different government agencies (Lon-
nie et al. 2000). The New York Times reported that
‘‘Results from a preliminary Department of the Interior
investigation laid the blame not on the precision of the
data or the accuracy of the calculation but on matters
of human judgment’’ (Johnson 2000). Thus, even ac-
curate information communicated using well-estab-
lished systems is subject to misinterpretation.
Three important considerations in the production of
‘‘good’’ predictions in the context of the broader pre-
diction process are accuracy, sophistication, and ex-
perience (Pielke 2003).
Accuracy.—Accuracy is important because ‘‘on bal-
ance, accurate forecasts are more likely than inaccurate
forecasts to improve the rationality of decision mak-
ing’’ (Ascher 1979:6). With a few exceptions, once a
forecast is produced and used in decision-making, few
ever look back to assess its accuracy. In ecology, un-
derstanding what constitutes forecast accuracy should
itself comprise a vigorous area of research since eval-
uating the goodness of ecological forecasts is problem-
atic for several reasons. First, simply comparing a pre-
diction with an actual event does not provide enough
information with which to evaluate its performance
(Murphy 1997). A more sophisticated approach is
needed. Thus, predictions should be evaluated in terms
of their ‘‘skill,’’ defined as the improvement provided
by the prediction over a naı¨ve forecast, i.e., such as
that which would be used in the absence of the pre-
diction. Second, an ecological prediction relevant to
decision-making may ‘‘falsify’’ itself if decision-mak-
ers act in response to the forecast as demonstrated by
Peterson et al. (2003). Third, unlike weather forecasts
for which there is an enormous body of experience,
many ecological forecasts will have very few or a sin-
gle case. Understanding outcomes in the context of
uncertainty and chance will mean understanding ac-
curacy itself will be highly uncertain.
Sophistication.—Decision-makers sometimes be-
lieve that a more sophisticated prediction methodology
will lead to greater predictive skill, i.e., given the com-
plexity of the world, a complex methodology should
perform better. In reality, the situation is not so clear
cut. An evaluation of the performance of complex mod-
els has shown that ‘‘methodological sophistication con-
tributes very little to the accuracy of [predictions]’’
(Ascher 1981:258, see also Keepin 1986). Oreskes
(2002) defines a ‘‘complexity paradox’’ as follows:
The more complex a model is—the more different
objects and interactions it encompasses—the more
open it is. . . . This might suggest that simpler models
are better—and in some cases no doubt they are—
but in ecosystems modeling we don’t want to aban-
don complexity, because we believe that the systems
we are modeling are in fact complex. . . . Indeed,
in many cases it is the very complexity of the systems
that has inspired us to model them in the first place—
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to try to understand the ways in which the numerous
parts of the system interact. This leads to a paradox:
the closer the model comes to capturing the full
range of processes and parameters in the system
being modeled, the more difficult it is to ascertain
whether or not the model is correct. The more we
strive for realism by incorporating as many as pos-
sible of all the different processes and different input
parameters that we believe to be operating in the
system, the more open the model becomes, and the
more difficult it is for us to know if our tests of the
model are meaningful.
—Oreskes (2002)
A lesson for decision-makers is that a sophisticated
prediction methodology (or by extension, the resources
devoted to development of predictions) does not nec-
essarily guarantee predictive or decision success, and
in some cases decision-making may benefit from sim-
ple exploratory methodologies (cf. Bankes 1993). More
sophisticated models often suffer from inadequate or
incomplete quantification of parameters or parameter
uncertainty that has only recently been overcome
(Clark et al. 2003, Ellner and Fieberg 2003). Because
complex models often require significant resources
(computation, human, etc.), a trade-off invariably re-
sults between producing one or a few realizations of
the complex model and many runs of a simpler, less
intensive version of the model. This is one area where
ecologists no doubt have important lessons to share
with the broader community of scientific modelers.
Experience.—In weather forecasts, society has the
best understanding of prediction as a product. Consider
in the United States the National Weather Service is-
sues more than 10 million predictions every year to
hundreds of millions of users. This provides a vast basis
of experience on which users can learn, through trial
and error, to understand the meaning of the prediction
products that they receive. Of course, room for con-
fusion exists. People can fail to understand predictions
for record events for which there is no experience, as
in the Grand Forks case, or even a routine event being
forecast (e.g., 70% chance of rain). But experience is
essential for effective decision-making, and most de-
cision-makers have little experience using models or
their products. Erev et al. provide a useful analogy:
Consider professional golfers who play as if they
combine information concerning distance and di-
rection of the target, the weight of the ball, and the
speed and direction of the wind. Now assume that
we ask them to play in an artificial setting in which
all the information they naturally combine in the field
is reduced to numbers. It seems safe to say that the
numerical representation of the information will not
improve the golfer’s performance. The more similar
are the artificial conditions we create to the con-
ditions with which the golfers are familiar, the better
will be their performance. One can assume that de-
cision making expertise, like golf expertise, is im-
proved by experience, but not always generalized to
new conditions.
—Erev et al. (1993:92)
The importance of experience does not necessarily
limit the usefulness of prediction products in decision-
making, but it does underscore the importance of the
decision context as a critical factor in using the output
of integrative models (cf. Stewart et al. 1997, Nicholls
1999).
How the scientific community presents prediction
products to decision-makers can influence how those
decision-makers view science more generally. Consid-
ering the following extended example:
In Brazil, scientists are not the only social group
offering predictions of El Nin˜o; rain prophets also
promote their ability to forecast seasons of rain and
drought. On a statistical basis, the scientists prob-
ably produce more accurate forecasts than most of
the rain prophets. However, public interactions with
the two communities suggest that the overall utility
of the scientific predictions for public choices may
be considerably more problematic because the re-
lationship between the scientists and the public
leaves the public with no way of interpreting how
much they should trust the scientists’ predictions.
The rain prophets may do a lousy job of predicting
the climate, but people know that and so are quick
to forgive them for being wrong and rarely inclined
to risk much on their predictions. On the other hand,
the scientific predictions are often treated insuffi-
ciently skeptically and great risks have been taken.
As a consequence, when the scientific predictions are
wrong they can produce a significant backlash. After
such an event, the public may end up too skeptical
of the scientists. Without the advantage of well-es-
tablished cultural traditions and practices that en-
able them to determine accurately how much to trust
scientists, people can easily lapse into being either
overly-critical and under-critical of scientific infor-
mation. Do the social networks yet exist that will
enable people to take up and integrate [climate] pre-
dictions into their choices with sufficient, but not
overly much skepticism? Probably not.
—Miller (1998:30)
This example illustrates the difficulties associated
with understanding prediction simply as an information
product. These difficulties can reflect back upon the
scientific community and result in a loss of public or
political support, if scientists are not careful to manage
expectations of what role predictions might play in
decision-making processes. The allure of justifying
prediction in both scientific and policy terms weighs
against realistic expectation setting, particularly when
decision-makers look to science (with funding) to
‘‘solve’’ complex and politically sensitive problems.
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CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, meeting many current and future en-
vironmental challenges will demand the judicious in-
tegration of ecological science with needs of decision-
making. The ‘‘best practices’’ discussed above illus-
trate a range of knowledge on the effective use of pre-
dictions and limits to predictions in decision-making
from considerable experience in the earth and atmo-
spheric sciences. All sciences could better meet their
potential contributions to decision-making if the les-
sons of experience are incorporated into future under-
standing and action at the interface of science and de-
cision-making. Institutional mechanisms, both within
science and in the political process that governs sci-
ence, for rewarding good, policy-relevant predic-
tions—or even better, prediction processes—are rare,
but are necessary if science is to systematically and
beneficially contribute to the needs of decision-makers.
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